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SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS STANDARD OF REVIEW: THE PTO FACES
OFF AGAINST THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
I came from an administrative law background. I thought the PTO
was an administrative agency. But we don't review it as if it is. There is
no other administrative agency in the United States that I know of in
which the standard of review over the agency's decisions gives the
appellate court as much power over the agency as we have over the
PTO.
-Judge S. Jay Plager
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INTRODUCTION

The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has mounted an aggressive
campaign to convince the Federal Circuit that its review of PTO factual
findings is bound by the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA)
"substantial evidence" standard of review.2 The "substantial evidence"
standard would replace the less deferential "clearly erroneous" standard
which is currently applied to PTO factual determinations.
In In re Zurko, the Federal Circuit, en banc, upheld the panel's
decision requiring the clearly erroneous standard.4 In re Zurko followed a
recent Federal Circuit three-judge opinion which strongly admonished the
Office of the Solicitor of the PTO for assuming the more deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied. The Federal Circuit
panel reprimanded the PTO, reiterating that the proper standard of
review for PTO factual determinations is the clearly erroneous standard.6
The panel also noted that the APA standard unfairly burdened the
applicant and required the applicant to expend resources to respond to
inappropriate
and unnecessary
arguments presented in disregard of
•
7
applicable precedent.
This Comment addresses the In re Zurko case before it was heard en
banc by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Federal Circuit

2. See, e.g., In re Lueders 111 F.3d 1569, 1574-78 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (deciding
to refer to the whole court for review en banc on the issue of whether the APA
standard applies and declining to apply APA standards in light of precedent); In
reMac Dermid Inc., 111 F.3d 890, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887,
889 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (declining to apply APA standards as requested by PTO)
aff'd en banc, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430-31
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (indicating that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies
to the PTO's factual determinations and not the APA standards as presented by
the PTO in its brief and oral argument); In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 614 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (finding it unnecessary for the court to address whether the APA is the
appropriate standard in certain cases because the court affirmed the PTO
decision under the more stringent standard); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568-69
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (concluding that it was not necessary to the disposition of this
case to address whether the APA standard applied to factual and legal
determinations as argued by the PTO).
3. 111 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing the PTO and holding that the
claimed method was not obvious and finding clear error in the factual
determinations underlying the PTO's § 103 rejection), affd en banc, 142 F.3d 1447
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
4. See id.
5. See In re Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1430-31 (stating that the PTO should not ask a
three judge panel of the Federal Circuit to overrule the court's many precedential
cases applying the "clearly erroneous" standard to PTO factual determinations).
6. See id.
7. See id. (noting also that the applicant felt like "'a bystander to some longrunning dispute to which he really [was] not a party'").
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subsequently rendered its en banc decision on May 4, 1998. The en banc
court ruled unanimously that it will continue to review findings of fact by
the Patent and Trademark Office for clear error, rather than applying the
more deferential standards of review provided in the Administrative
Procedure Act.9 The en banc court's decision reversed the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences based on the reasons set out in the court's
Subsequently, Bruce A. Lehman, Commissioner of
panel opinion.1'
Patents and Trademarks, petitioned for certiorari to the United States
2, 1998.11
Supreme Court, which was granted on November
If the Supreme Court decides that the more deferential APA
"substantial evidence" standard of review applies, the impact on patent
prosecution could be dramatic. Issues relating to underlying factual
determinations would become virtually unreviewable on appeal. Affected12
utility,
issues would include PTO factual determinations about
16
.
15
11.
and obviousness.
anticipation, best mode, written descriptions
Other affected issues include the determination of what prior art
references teach, the differences between those teachin9s and a claimed
invention, and the impact of "secondary considerations."
If the Supreme Court decides that the APA's deferential standard of
review applies to PTO factual findings it will dramatically change the way
patent prosecutors secure patents in the future.' The entire patent bar
8.

See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).

9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom.,
Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. Ct. 401 (Nov. 2, 1998).
12. See, e.g., In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that
"[t]he first issue thus is whether the determination that Ziegler did not establish

that the German application disclosed a practical utility for the polypropylene was
clearly erroneous").
13. See, e.g., In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that
"[a] nticipation is a question of fact subject to review under the 'clearly erroneous'
standard").
14. See, e.g., DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(stating that "[blest mode is a question of fact. Hence, our review of the board's
best mode determination is under a clearly erroneous standard") (citations
omitted).
15. See, e.g., Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that
"[c]ompliance with the written description requirement is a question of fact
which we review for clear error").
16. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The factual
determinations of obviousness include: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
(2) the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4) the "objective" indicia like commercial
success and long felt need. See id.
17. See id.
18. SeeJanice M. Mueller, CraftingPatentsfor the Twenty-First Century: Maximize
Patent Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a Post-Markham/HiltonDavis
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should be concerned about the expanding role the PTO is trying to assert
in adjudicating patent matters before that agency. As Judge Paul R.
Michel of the Federal Circuit stated: "One of my main messages to you is
that standards of review influence dispositions in the Federal Circuit far
more than many advocates realize." 9
The purpose of this Comment is threefold. First, it provides
background on the PTO's arguments for deferential review under the
APA. Second, it suggests a permissive interpretation of APA section 706
which permits review for clear error. And finally, it supports the
permissive interpretation of section 706 with a variety of arguments.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

AdministrativeLaw

Administrative law is governed mainly by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).2 0 Enacted in 1946, this act governs most decisionmaking by federal agencies. The APA outlines the scope of review
that
21
the courts are to apply when reviewing administrative actions.
While
courts have the final interpretation of law, courts often defer to an
agency's interpretation of its enabling statute, especially when Congress
has explicitly empowered the agency to interpret the laws it enforces.
In review of agency action, treatment of "questions of fact" is usually
governed by section 706 of the APA. The APA provides three criteria by
which to review agency determinations of fact. While there is substantial
deference to agency factual determinations, actions which are (1)
arbitrary and capricious, (2) unsupported by substantial evidence
gathered through formal hearings, or (3) unsupported by facts considered
on de novo review, must be set aside.2 3 Recall that appellate courts review
factual determinations in non-jury court trials under the "clearly
24
erroneous" standard . The spectrum of the reviewing court's deference
to the fact finder's determinations, from most deferential to the fact
finder's determinations to least deferential to fact finder's determinations,
is (1) arbitrary, capricious, (2) substantial evidence, (3) clearly erroneous,
(4) de novo review.

World, 79J. PAT. OFF.Soc'Y 499, 513-14 (1997).
19. Nard, supra note 1, at 1415.
20. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (1994).
21. See5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
24. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 52(a) (stating that "findings of fact, whether based on
oral. or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous").
25. See Robert L. Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators,Judges andJuries: A
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De novo review of agency adjudications means a new trial (hardly a
"review" as such) .26The clearly erroneous standard provides for a more
rigorous 27review of agency findings than does the substantial evidence
standard.
The substantial evidence test has been compared to the
28
appellate review of judgments predicated on jury verdicts.
The
substantial evidence test is a more rigorous review of agency findings than
is the arbitrary and capricious review.
Regardless of the scope of review,
the reviewing court is req uired to give the agency's action "a thorough,
probing, in-depth review."
The APA's substantial evidence test applies only to formal
adjudication and formal rulemaking, which are made on the record."'

ComparativeAnalysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 72-89 (1944).
26. See KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 451 (3d ed. 1996).
27. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993) (stating that while "review under the 'clearly
erroneous' standard is significantly deferential, . . . application of a
reasonableness standard is even more deferential"); Consolo v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-620 (1966) (stating that "[w]e have defined
'substantial evidence' as 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion'"); Stern, supra note 25, at 88-89
(stating that "[plolicy, authority and history all thus show that the 'clearly
erroneous' rule gives the reviewing court broader powers than the 'substantial
evidence' formula"). See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2, at 177 (3d. ed. 1994) (explaining the
substantial evidence test).
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292,
300 (1939) (stating that "[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a scintilla.., and it
must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict
when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury"); accord
Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966); see also
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.11 (2d ed. 1984) (stating that "[t]he
test of review of a jury verdict is also usually stated in terms of substantial
evidence. This leads to the conclusion that the scope of review of jury verdicts
and of agency findings is the same"); Stem, supra note 25, at 76 (stating that the
substantial evidence rule governing the review of administrative findings of fact is
the same as that applied to ajury verdict).
29. See American Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S.
402, 412 n.7 (1983) (stating that the arbitrary and capricious test is "more lenient"
than the substantial evidence test); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143
(1967) (stating that the substantial evidence test provided "a considerably more
generous judicial review than the 'arbitrary and capricious' test"). See generally
American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 314 (1952) (stating that
the relationship between rules and the regulatory scheme is to protect against
rules being deemed arbitrary); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S.
176, 182 (1953) (holding that state regulation is measured by the arbitrary and
capricious standard).
30. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415

(1971).
31. See DAviS &
evidence test).

PIERCE,

supra note 27, § 11.2 (explaining the substantial
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The court must evaluate the record of the agency's proceedings to
ascertain whether there is evidence in the record as a whole to support
the agency's decision, regardless of whether the court would have reached
a different conclusion on the same facts. 2 The key to the test is whether a
"reasonable mind" would accept the evidence "as adequate to form a
conclusion.""
The arbitrary and
capricious test 34applies to review agency acts which
....
occur through informal adjudication.
To make this finding the court
must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the
35
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error in judgment.
Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the
36
ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.
The court is not
37
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. So long as
there is a rational basis for the agency's decision, the reviewing court may
not overturn an agency's action as arbitrary or capricious.38
B.

Patent and Trademark Office Proceedings

A patent
PTO's Board
"heard" by at
Interferences,

applicant may appeal an examiner's final rejection to the
of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 9 Each appeal is
least three members of the Board of Patent
Appeals and
40
who are chosen by the Commissioner.
The Board may

32. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620-21 (1966).
33. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (stating
"[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion").
34. See DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 11.4 (explaining the arbitrary and
capricious test).
35. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 84 (1990). The court stated:
The method of computing the netting period does not make the
regulations arbitrary and capricious. The inevitable delay between the
discovery that something is amiss and the formal 'initial determination'
of error (which closes the netting period) is necessary to avoid spur-ofthe-moment decisions. The Secretary's regulations limit delay, and the
hypothesis that the Secretary will deliberately delay to net-in additional
underpayments is implausible.
Respondents' alternative regime of
separate accounting would increase the administrative burden, and their
alternative suggestion of delayed reimbursement of underpayments does
not address the alleged delay problem.
Id.
39. See 35 U.S.C. § 70(b) (1994).
40. See id. Note that the proceedings before the Board are purely paper
proceedings. See Briefs Are Filed In En Banc Case On Federal Circuit Standard of
Review, 55 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.(BNA) No. 1351, at 32, 33 (Nov. 13,
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affirm or reverse the examiner's action and may enter a new ground for
rejection. From an adverse ruling of the Board, the applicant may either
42
appeal on the record to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or
file a de novo civil suit to obtain a patent against the Commissioner in the
District Court for the District of Columbia.
The PTO is one of the oldest agencies in the American
44
Throughout the history of the Federal Circuit
administrative system.
and its predecessor courts4 5 the factual decisions of the PTO boards have
been reviewed by the same standards that are applied to decisions of
district courts. This standard is referred to as "clearly erroneous."4 The
use of this standard to review PTO decisions dates back over one hundred
47
years. In a recent plurality opinion, Judge Rich noted: "The fact that we
apply the clearly erroneous standard of review rather than the more
restrictive substantial evidence standard usually applied to administrative
48
of the Board."
boards illustrates the purely administrative nature
C.

Patent and Trademark Office Argument

Despite this long history of review precedent, the PTO has crafted an
argument purporting that the proper standard of review should be
prescribed by a restrictive interpretation of the agency review standards in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), section 706. 4 The PTO believes
that the clearly erroneous standard of review is inconsistent with the

1997) (noting that although the statute requires that appeals be heard, the
proceeding "is purely a paper proceeding").
41. See 35 U.S.C. § 70(b) (1994).
42. See id. §§ 141-144.
43. See id. § 145.
44. The first patent statute was enacted in 1790. See 38 TRADEMARK REP. 149,
149 (1948). However, it was the 1836 Patent Act that created the Patent Office
and vested it with the authority to administer the patent system. See id.
45.

See DONALD R.

DUNNER,

ET AL.,

COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL

CIRCUrr: PRACrTIE AND PROCEDURE § 1.01, at 1-2 (1996). The predecessor courts
were the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and that court's predecessor, the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. See id.
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (stating that findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous); see
also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2591 (2d ed. 1995) (stating that because Rule 52(a) is fully applicable to patent
cases, findings of fact may be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous).
47. See Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120, 129 (1894). "It is enough to say that
the testimony as a whole is not of a character or sufficient to produce clear
conviction that the Patent Office made a mistake... ." Id.
48. In reAlappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
49. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994)).
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review prescribed by the APA. 0
The• APA
argument involves a simple
plain meaning analysis
of
51
defined
52
Courts
section 706.
The PTO is an agency as defined by the APA.
including the Federal Circuit have recognized the PTO as an "agency"
under the APA.55 The PTO's factual findings in the course of determining
54
patentability are "agency actions" as defined by the APA.
The PTO's
argument is that the courts must adhere to the literal plain meaning of
the language of section 706. Therefore, the
• 55PTO's factual findings should
be subject to the APA's standards of review.
The APA's legislative history appears to lend support to the use of
56
the APA's standards of review for review of PTO decisions.
Prior to

50. The PTO's Brief on the Merits stated that PTO Board's factual
determinations should be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard (for
formal adjudications) set out in § 706(2)(E) of the APA. However, if the this
standard does not apply, then the arbitrary or capricious standard (for all other
adjudication) under § 706(2) (A) of the APA should apply. See Briefs Are Filed In
En Banc Case On FederalCircuit Standard of Review, 55 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J.(BNA) No. 1351, at 32, 32 (Nov. 13, 1997). During oral arguments the PTO
conceded that the proceedings before the PTO Board are not formal
adjudications. See En Banc Federal Circuit Hears Argument on Reviewing PTO Fact
Findings, 55 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.(BNA) No. 1354, at 96, 97 (Dec. 4,
1997). It is difficult to understand why the PTO would argue primarily for a
standard of review that it concedes the APA denies.
51.
See NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01
(5th ed. 1992) (noting that "the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance,
be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain... the
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms").
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (b(1) (1994) (defining 'agency' as each authority of the
Government of the United States); 5 U.S.C. § 701 (b) (1) (A)-(H) (1996) (listing
exceptions, none which apply to the PTO); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1994)
(stating that "[t] his chapter [on judicial review] applies. . . except to the extent
that - (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law").
53. See, e.g., Singer Co. v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 671 F.2d 232, 236 n.7 (7th Cir.
1982) (noting that the "[t]he Patent Office falls within the definition of an
administrative 'agency' established by the Administrative Procedure Act"); Ray v.
Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (treating the PTO as an agency under
the APA for purposes of reviewing a challenge to the PTO's denial of a petition to
reinstate a patent); Glaxo Operations UK, Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 394 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (treating the PTO as an agency under the APA for purposes of
reviewing the PTO's denial of a request for a patent extension).
54. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(6), 551(13), 701 (b) (2) (1994) (stating that an "order
means the whole or a part of a final disposition... in a matter other than
rulemaking").
55. See 5 U.S.C § 706 (1994) (stating that "the reviewing court shall...
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action" under
the APA standards).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 16 (1946) (stating that "[t]he APA is meant
to be operative 'across the board' in accordance with its terms, or not at all"). See
generally DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 1.4 (explaining the purpose of the APA).
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enacting the APA in 1946, Congress considered legislation governing
57
administrative law for over ten years. One unsuccessful proposal was the
1940 Walter-Logan bill.5 8 The Walter-Logan bill expressly exempted the
PTO from coverage of the bill.5 9 However, the exclusionary language in
the enacted Act was omitted from the APA'sjudicial review section. Thus,
the PTO should be treated like every other agency.
Moreover, the Patent Act's statutes for judicial review of PTO
decisions do not preempt application of the APA standards of review.60
The Supreme Court has indicated that the APA standards of review apply
when the agency's enabling statutes are silent on a standard.6 1 The Patent
Act does not contain any standard of review for PTO adjudications,
therefore, the APA's standard of review should govern.
The PTO also declares that its expertise in patent matters justifies the
deference given under the APA. Courts have recognized that agencies
with particular expertise are afforded deference in accordance with
62
Moreover, application of the APA
decisions based on that expertise.
standards of review is necessary to maintain uniformity, asserting that63once
a section of APA has been applied to one aspect of agency action, the

57.
58.

See S. REP. No. 79-752, at 1 (1945).
See id. at 3-4.

59.

See S. Doc. No. 76-145, at 24 (1940).

60. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994) (setting forth no standards of review).
61. See American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461
U.S. 402, 412-13 n.7 (1983) (stating that absent a specific command to employ a
particular standard of review, agency action should be reviewed under the APA
standards); see also Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 37577 (1989) (holding that the APA provided the standard of review for a challenge
to a statement prepared pursuant to National Environmental Policy Act, where
the statute did not provide a standard of review); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 14042 (1973) (holding that the APA provided the standard for reviewing the denial
of a bank application where the statute did not provide the standard of review).
62. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)
(stating that "[w]hen examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed
to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential"); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(recognizing the PTO's expertise in technological arts); Interconnect Planning
Corp. v. E. Fiel, 774 F.2d 1132, 1139, (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that "[t]his
statutory presumption [validity] derives in part from recognition of the
technological expertise of the patent examiners").
63. See, e.g., Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that
agency action to terminate patent for failure to make the necessary maintenance
fees may be set aside if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 304 (1995);
Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1527 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that the
court reviews the PTO decision for abuse of discretion when the PTO sanctioned
patent holders for noncompliance with regulation); Animal Legal Defense Fund
v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (using the APA to challenge PTO
rulemaking).
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entire APA should apply to every agency action.
D. In re Zurko
Mary Zurko applied for a patent on a method for improving
security in a computer system. 64 The PTO found the invention obvious in
light of two disclosed references.65 The Federal Circuit reversed, finding
the Board's obviousness determination clearly erroneous as based on a
66
hindsight view of the prior art. The Federal Circuit rejected the Board's
conclusion that the application's claimed step of obtaining confirmation
67
Neither of the
over a trusted pathway is inherent in the prior art.
references disclosed by the applicant teaches, either explicitly or
implicitly, communicating with the user over a trusted pathway, the court
held.68
The PTO's petition for a rehearing contended that the Federal
Circuit's long practice of reviewing PTO factual determinations under the
69
clearly erroneous standard violates the Administrative Procedure Act.
The PTO argued that the rejection should have been affirmed under the
APA's more deferential (to the trier of fact) "substantial evidence" test,
citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E). 7 ° Zurko maintained that the clearly
erroneous standard has been applied for years with no objection from the
PTO, that a different standard would make no difference in this case, and
from coverage.71
that the APA and its legislative history exempt the PTO
In July 1997, the Federal Circuit announced that it would review the case
en banc.

III. ANALYSIS
A.

Chevron Analysis

The analysis begins with the question of whether the PTO's
interpretation of its enabling statute is controlling or even requires
deference. The seminal Supreme Court case that has addressed the
64. See In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1997), affd en banc, 142 F.3d
1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 889-90.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See 54 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) No. 1331, at 139 (June 12,
1997).
70.

71.
1997).
72.

See id.

See 54 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) No. 1335, at 211 (July 17,
See In re Zurko, 116 F.3d 874, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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standards applied in determining the validity of an agency's interpretation
of the statute it enforces is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. In Chevron the Court established a new two-step approach to
judicial review of agency interpretations of provisions contained in statutes
that delegate regulatory power to an agency.
The first step is to determine whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter. The court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
In other words, if the
language of the statute indicates that Congress has resolved the policy
issue that corresponds to the interpretive issue before the court, the
court's job is to enforce the congressional policy decision against the
agency.
Congressional intent is normally embodied in the agency's
enabling statute.
The proper standard of review of PTO factual determinations is
clearly not defined in the PTO's enabling statute. 5 Title 35, section 141
of the United States Code, entitled "Appeal to Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit," sets out the dissatisfied applicant's right to appeal to the
Federal Circuit. 76 No standard of review is set forth, however. Section 143
of the United States Code, title 35, entitled "Proceedings on appeal," sets
forth the Commissioner's duty to transmit a certified list of the documents
which comprise the entire record to the Federal Circuit.77 Again, no
standard of review is set forth. Section 144, entitled "Decision on appeal,"
states that review of the PTO decision is decided on the record that was
before the PTO.78 No standard of review is prescribed. Section 145,
entitled "Civil action to obtain patent," states that any party dissatisfied
73. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
74. See id. at 842-43.
75. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1994) (setting forth no standard of review).
76. See id. Generally, the judicial review provisions of patent statutes mark an
effort by Congress to assure, not restrict, adequacy of judicial review of PTO
decisions. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Brenner, 383 F.2d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968).
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 143 (1994). The Federal Circuit is bound to hear and
determine appeals on evidence produced before the PTO, and may not consider
matters of evidence appearing in counsel's brief and not appearing in the record.
See Martin v. Snyder, 214 F.2d 177, 178 (C.C.P.A. 1954).
78. See 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1994). A reviewing court will not disturb the rulings
of the Patent Office (now Patent and Trademark Office) on practice matters
absent a showing of clear error. See In re Pantzer, 341 F.2d 121, 126 (C.C.P.A.
1965). The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (now Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) will not disturb the ruling of the Patent Office (now Patent and
Trademark Office) in a matter of Office practice, absent a showing of clear error.
See In re Gartner, 223 F.2d 502, 504 (C.C.P.A. 1955). The rulings of Commissioner
on questions of mere practice will not be reviewed, unless discretion was abused.
See In reAustin, 40 F.2d 756, 760 (C.C.P.A. 1930).
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with a patent decision of the PTO may have a civil remedy by civil action
against the Commissioner in United States court for the District of
Columbia. 9 No standard of review is set forth. Section 146, entitled "Civil
action in case of interference," states that any party dissatisfied with the
civil action.0
interference decision of the PTO may have a civil remedy by
No standard of review is set forth. Therefore, the PTO's enabling statute
does not define the proper, or any, standard of review of PTO factual
determinations.
If the court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, then the court must proceed with the second
step in the analysis. The second step for the court is to determine
whether the agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction
of the statute. A literal interpretation of step two of the analysis instructs
reviewing courts not to interpret ambiguous language in statutes that
82
The reviewing court retains its role in
delegate power to the agencies.
the policymaking process, but its role is limited to making certain the
81
agency's resolution of the policy is a reasonable one.
Chevron's applicability to the PTO has been particularly hotly
contested. One commentator has argued that the Federal Circuit needs
to apply Chevron to questions of patent validity and non-obviousness, as
Another commentator argues that
well as other PTO determinations.
the Federal Circuit is the primary expert and source of patent law, not the

79. See 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1994). The intent of this section, dealing with a civil
action to obtain a patent, is to keep the administration of Title 35 from becoming
too technical and to conserve the original purpose of the Tide. See Evans v.
Watson, 142 F. Supp. 225, 227-28 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The ultimate finding in a
patent case is a conclusion drawn from undisputed or established facts.
Subsidiary facts do not change such a finding from one of fact to one of law. See
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Smith-Blair, Inc., 322 F.2d 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1963). A
finding of fact is not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous. See id. at 881.
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1994). The purpose of the provision of § 146 is to
give a judicial remedy to an applicant who has been finally denied a patent
because of the Patent Office's decision against him and in favor of his adversary
on a question of priority. See Sanford v. Kepner, 344 U.S. 13, 14 (1952). When
the trial court decides the factual issue of priority against him, and thus affirms
refusal of the patent by the Patent Office, he has obtained the full remedy this
section gives him, and only if he wins on a priority issue may he proceed under
further provisions of this section permitting the court to authorize issuance of a
patent. See id at 15. As with any bench trial, the court of appeals reviews the
district court's judgment in interference actions for clearly erroneous findings of
fact and errors of law. See Conservolite, Inc. v. Widmayer, 21 F.3d 1098, 1100
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
81. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
82. See DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 1.7, at 28.
83. See id.
84. See Nard, supranote 1, at 1450-64.
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PTO; therefore, the theoretical justification for deference to the PTO
under Chevron fails.85
With the basic ground work of agency interpretation laid, it must be
stated that questions on the proper scope of review are questions of law.
The final word on interpretation of law and its applicability, whether
86
constitutional or statutory, resides in the courts.
This fundamental
concept is stated in the APA: "[t]o the extent necessary to decision and
when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action." 87 The
reviewing court "may substitute their judgment on 8questions of law for
that of the agency on a virtually carte blanche basis."
The doctrine that
courts are the ultimate interpreter of the law has its origin in Marbury v.
Madison.89 "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.... If two laws conflict with each other,
the courts must decide on the operation of each." 90
The breadth of Chevron is limited. Chevron is not applicable "when
the particular context suggests that deference would be a poor
reconstruction of congressional desires." 9' The clearest case is when the
agency does not have the authority at all.
Agencies with the power to
prosecute violations but not the power to make rules lack the "pedigree"
that is a prerequisite for deference.
The clearest case of the PTO's lack of rulemaking power is
demonstrated in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler.94 In Merck, Commissioners
Kessler and Lehman contended that under Chevron the PTO's final
determination was entitled to controlling weight.95 The Federal Circuit
corrected the Commissioners mistake as to Chevron's breadth. The court
stated that only agencies with rulemaking powers deserve deference on
statutory interpretations. 96 The broadest rulemaking power of the PTO is

85. See R. Carl Moy, JudicialDeference to the PTO's Interpretationsof Patent Law,
74J. PAT. &TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 406, 438-39 (1992).
86. See5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
87. Id.
88. JACOBA. STEIN, ETAL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 51.01[1], at 4-6 (1997).
89. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 137 (1801).
90. Id. at 177.
91. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2091 (1990) (discussing Chevron's reach).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 2093.
94. 80 F.3d 1543, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
95. See id. at 1549.
96. See id.; see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 441
(7th Cir. 1994); DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 6.3, at 234; Michael Herz,
Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6
ADMIN. L.J. Am.U. 187, 200-03 (1992).
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found in 35 U.S.C. § 6(a)."7 That section authorizes the Commissioner to
promulgate
98 ... regulations directed only to the conduct of proceedings in the
PTO;
i t does not grant the Commissioner the authority to issue
substantive rules. 99
Congress has not vested the Commissioner with general substantive
patent rulemaking power.' °° "[T]he exercise of quasi-legislative authority
by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of
such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body
Therefore, the rule set forth in Chevron does not apply to
imposes."
PTO interpretations outside the rulemaking power vested in it by
Congress.
The framework set forth dictates that the Federal Circuit should
decide the PTO's standard of review without deference to the PTO's
position. The PTO enabling statute is silent on the issue of the proper
standard of review. 102 The statutory interpretation of the proper standard
of review is beyond the power of the PTO and therefore is given no
deference under Chevron. Even if the interpretation was within the PTO's
power, the proper standard of review is a legal question. According to the
APA and the common law, reviewing courts determine legal questions.
The fact that the PTO has concluded that it deserves greater autonomy is
not legally relevant, much less controlling. Therefore, the final word on
interpretation of law resides in the reviewing court.

B.

A PermissiveInterpretationof Section 706

The PTO's argument for more deferential review is based on the
assurmtion that section 706 compels that result under the "plain meaning
rule."
The rule states that the plain and unambiguous meaning of the
words used by Congress prevails in the absence of a clearly expressed

97. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994).
98. See id.
99. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
see also Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
accord Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 398-99 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
100. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
101. Chrysler Corp. v. Secretary of Defense, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979).
102. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
103. See SINGER, supra note 51, at 81 (stating that "the meaning of the statute
must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed,
and if that is plain... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms"). However, if the words of the statute are plain and unambiguous, the
court may still look to the legislative history if the plain meaning of the words vary
from the policy of the statute. See id.
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legislative intent to the contrary. 104 When faced with an ambiguity the
court is to examine the legislative history to determine Congress' intent.'05
Congress' 106
intent clearly has been to consent to the common law standard
of review.
However, even without Congressional intent, review of PTO
factual determinations for clear error is still consistent with the literal
language of section 706. It has long been recognized that the plain
meaning rule is inherently suspect.10 7 Words are nearly always susceptible
to several.. meanings;
therefore, statutory provisions often have no
.
. . 108
meaning that is plain.
This is the case with section 706. The relevant provision reads: "The
reviewing court shall.., hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be ... unsupported by substantial
evidence. . . ."'09 By its terms, this language defines only a class of
determinations that must be reversed-those not supported by substantial
evidence. It provides no direct definition of which agency determinations
must be upheld.
The PTO believes that this language applies to all factual
determinations, asserting that.. its
made on substantial
110 determinations
evidence must be left standing.
The PTO believes that section 706
defines the threshold between reversible and proper findings of fact. "
But the literal language of section 706 does not support the PTO's
reading. Rather, the language is consistent with the application of any
standard of review that is at least as searching as one for substantial
evidence. One such standard is review under the existing, more inclusive
standard of clear error. Use of the clear error standard results in the
Federal Circuit reversing each determination
by the PTO that is
2
unsupported by substantial evidence."

104. See Mansell v. Mansell 490 U.S. 581, 592 (1989);
Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
105. See Hoechst, 917 F.2d at 526.
106. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.

Hoechst

107. See SINGER supra note 51, §§ 46.01, 46.07 (defining the plain meaning
rule and the limits of literalism). If it is clear that a literal interpretation of the
meaning of the words is inconsistent with the legislative intent or that a literal
interpretation leads to an absurd result, the words of the statute will be modified
to agree with the intention of the legislature. See id. at § 46.07. "While the
intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it,
the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a
literal interpretation of such words." Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 F. 693, 696 (1897).
108. See SINGER supra note 51, §§ 46.01, 46.07.
109. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
110. See Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 18, In re Zurko, No. 96-1258 (Fed.
Cir. argued Dec. 2, 1997).
111. See id.
112. See Stem, supra note 25, at 87-89; DAvis& PIERCE, supra note 27, § 11.2.
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C. Supportfor the Permissive Interpretationof Section 706
A closer look at the APA reveals that review for clear error is
consistent with the literal interpretation of section 706. For over fifty
years, with both issues clearly before it, Congress has repeatedly refused to
modify the review of PTO decisions in the PTO's enabling statute. Review
for clear error is faithful to the APA's purpose, which is to provide a set of
guaranteed minimum rights and to ensure uniform adjudication of
agency decisions. Statements by both the then attorney general and the
commissioner of the PTO confirms that review for clear error survived the
enactment of the APA. The PTO does not perform functions that call for
deferential review. The determination of a patentable invention is a
policy decision, and the appellate court is the proper place to determine
policy. Finally, review for clear error provides doctrinal stability.

1. CongressionalConsent
Congress' failure to modify the PTO's enabling statute to include a
reference to the APA's deferential standard of review amounts to
congressional consent that the clearly erroneous standard of review does
not conflict with the APA. After the enactment of the APA, Congress has
spoken on topics directly relating to the interaction between the PTO, the
reviewing courts," 3 and the law on patents. At each opportunity, Congress
has refused to change the standard of review for PTO factual
determinations.
Prior to the APA's enactment in 1946, the decision of the PTO
boards were reviewed
114 by the same standards as applied to a decision from
the district court.
After the enactment of the APA, review of PTO
decisions continued without enhanced deference." 5
Congress' first
opportunity to reconcile patent law with any different APA standard came
in 1952 when Congress revised and codified patent law into Title 35 of the
United States Code. 116 Both issues were plainly before Congress. The
review 117
of PTO decisions without enhanced deference had a long
history, and Congress had recently spent several years studying, drafting,

113.
114.
115.

See5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
See id.
See In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re GPAC, Inc., 57

F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In reVaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re De
Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Kunzmann, 326 F.2d 424, 426
(C.C.P.A 1964).
116. See Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified
as 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)).
117. See5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
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and enacting the APA. n 8 However, no change of the standard of review
was made by Congress. Ten years passed with PTO decisions reviewed
without enhanced deference, under the clearly erroneous standard.
In 1962 Congress acted again on patent law. This time Congress
expressly incorporated a citation to the APA into Title 35."9 The express
application of the APA to Section 135(c) supports the conclusion that the
APA does not affect sections that do not reference it. Inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius is a maxim applied to statutory construction. 2 0 "As the
maxim is applied to statutory interpretation... there is an inference that
all omissions should be understood as exclusions." 121 Since the APA is
referenced in the PTO's enabling statute, a strong inference can be drawn
that the omission of an APA reference in all other sections was
intentional. Another twenty years passed with PTO decisions reviewed
without enhanced deference.
In 1982 Congress again revised patent law with the Federal Courts
Improvement Act.
Through inaction, the Federal Courts Improvement
12
Act ratified the review practice of previous courts over PTO decisions. 3
This long history of Congressional inaction and failure to modify the
PTO's enabling statute to include a reference to the APA's deferential
standard of review, amounts to congressional consent that the clearly
erroneous standard of review does not conflict with the APA.
2. APA's Minimum ProtectionsPurpose
Application of APA's deferential standard of review to PTO factual
determinations that are currently reviewed for clear error is contrary to a
basic purposes of APA. A basic purpose of the APA was to124outline the
minimum rights private parties have against federal agencies.
Applying

118.

See discussion infra Parts III.C.4, III.C.5.

119. See Act of October 15, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-831, 76 Stat. 958 (1962)
(codified as 35 U.S.C. § 135(c)). The last paragraph of section 135(c) states that
"any discretionary action of the Commissioner under this subsection shall be
reviewable under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act." Id.
120. See SINGER, supra note 51, § 47.23 (explaining the history and operation
of the maxim as applied to statutory construction).
121. Id.
122. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
25 (1982). This Act merged the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with the
Court of Claims thereby creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See
id. The Federal Circuit received nationwide jurisdiction over all appeals from
patent cases in the district courts in addition to direct appeals from the PTO. See
id.
123. See In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that the
Federal Courts Improvement Act ratified, through inaction, the practice of
appellate court review of PTO decisions without enhanced deference).
124. See H.R. REP.No. 79-1980, at 16 (1946).
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the APA's deferential standard of review to PTO factual determinations
substantially frustrates this purpose.
The APA is an outline of minimum rights for private parties. The
APA standard is a guarantee of minimum rights. Enactment of the APA
was a response to the large increase in administrative activity that occurred
in this country after World War I, and especially during the era of the New
Deal.'
By the end of this period, the practices of the various agencies
116
had grown into a disorderly hodge-podge.
Government by
administration was also considered dangerous to the Constitutional
concept of separation of powers.117
The APA was, as a consequence, a legislative action aimed primarily
at protecting the rights128 of individuals from potential depredations of
administrative agencies.
Consistent with this intent, the Act sets out a
basic set of protections to which individuals are guaranteed. In fact, the
reports of both houses of Congress, characterize the APA as setting forth a
"minimum" set of procedures and requirements.129
This overall principal applies fully to the standard of review set forth
in section 706(2) (C). As the House Report details, this provision was
specifically directed at the then-existing practice of some agencies to base
determinations on factual findings that were supported by far less than
substantial evidence. According to that body, the substantial evidence
standard was "exceedingly important" because "[d]ifficulty has come
about by the practice of agencies and courts to rely on something
•
,,130 less suspicion, surmise, implications, or plainly incredible evidence.
In sum, it is clear that Congress intended the language in section 706
to define the minimum vigilance that courts henceforth would be

125. See John Dickinson, The Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act (Section 10) Background and Effect, in FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 546-47 (George
Warren ed. 1947).
126. SeeH.R. REP. No. 76-1149, at 2 (1939).
127. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 1.4, at 12 (citing the Report of the
President's Committee on Administrative Management, 39-40 (1937), which
characterized administrative agencies as a "headless 'forth branch' of the
government"). Concerns about a 'headless forth branch' continue today. See id.
128. See H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 10 (1946) (stating that "the law must
provide that the governors shall be governed, and the regulators shall be
regulated").
129. See S. REP. No. 79-752, at 7 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 16 (1945);
see also ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 16, 23 (1947). "As
you proceed through the official documents [of the Act's legislative history] you
will find time after time, so that there can be no doubt whatever, that the purpose
was limitation of procedure, of powers, of methods, of sanctions and of remedies."
Id.
130. H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 45 (1946); accord S. REP. No. 79-752, at 30
(1945); see also Dickinson, supranote 125, at 597-98.
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required to exercise when reviewing the factual determinations of
agencies. To characterize the provision as also defining the maximum
level of vigilance that courts would be permitted is simply reading more
into the language than Congress intended. Such a reading would indeed
be contrary to Congressional intent.
The correctness of a permissive interpretation is confirmed by
developments both before and after the APA was enacted. Prior to
enactment of the APA, both Congress and the courts had imposed higher
standards of review on various agencies as circumstances warranted.'
The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act
plainly states that section 10 of the Act (now codified as section 706) was
This plainly implies
intended only to "restate" the law ofjudicial review.'
that the various pre-existing standards were to survive. Congress has also
require a standard of judicial
subsequently enacted statutes that explicitly
1 33
review higher than substantial evidence.
The permissive interpretation is also confirmed by analogy to how
the APA regulates the fields of rule-making and adjudication. The APA
clearly permits the use of procedures during these activities beyond those
that are set out in the Act.1 34 Just as the APA entrusts the design of such
internal procedures to the agency, 1 5 it should be understood to permit
the exercise
of more searching review by the courts under the clear error
3 6
standard.1

131.
See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, REPORT OF THE
COMMITrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, APPOINTED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT, TO INVESTIGATE THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL
REFORM IN VARIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND TO SUGGEST IMPROVEMENTS
THEREIN, S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 90, 91 (1941); JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw 56-71 (1927); Stem, supra note 25, at 87-89.
132. TOM C. CLARK, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947); see Dickinson, supranote 125, at 581.
133. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supranote 27, § 11.3.

134. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 79-752, at 14-15 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 70-1980, at 1617 (1946).
135. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1977) (holding "that generally speaking this section
of the Act [5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976)] established the maximum procedural
requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies
in conducting rulemaking procedures. [However,] [a]gencies are free to grant
additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion").
136. Previous Supreme Court decisions are not to the contrary. The first,
American Paper Inst. Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402
(1983), presented review of a rule promulgated by the Federal Energy
Commission under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. There,
the Court chose the arbitrary and capricious standard of section 706(2) (A) as the
more lenient standard of review under consideration. The case did not present
the issue of whether a standard outside section 706 should apply. The second
case, Marsh v. Oregon National Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989),
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3. APA's Uniformity Purpose
Another purpose of the APA was to ensure uniformity across judicial
jurisdictions.
The appellate structure for review of PTO findings
provides inherent uniformity.
The Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from the PTO.' 38
In 1972, Congress created the Hruska Commission to study the
entire federal appellate court system and make recommendations for
change.139 The Hruska Commission determined that the federal appellate
system's problem was its inability to explicitly adjudicate issues of national
law.14 As a consequence, uncertainty in the law among circuits created
massive forum shopping among the circuits.' 4 ' The Hruska Commission
found that forum shopping was particularly acute in the area of patent
law.14 2 However, opponents argued
143 vigorously against the formation of a
specialized court on patent law.
Congress took the unusual step of
consolidating all patent appeals into the Federal Circuit for the purpose of
providing that court with overall doctrinal responsibility for the law of

presented review of the Department of the Army's handling of an environmental
impact statement under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of
1969. There, the Court did choose to use the arbitrary and capricious standard of
section 706(2) (A) over a competing "reasonableness" standard. See id. at 377
n.23. As the Court noted in Marsh, "the difference between the 'arbitrary and
capricious' and 'reasonableness' standards is not of great pragmatic consequence.
Accordingly, our decision today.will not require substantial reworking of longestablished NEPA law." Id. (citations omitted). The third decision of the
Supreme Court, Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), reversed a decision by the
Fourth Circuit regarding the Comptroller of the Currency's adjudication of a
request for a national bank charter. That case, like American Paper, also presented
a choice between the standards of "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial
evidence." See id. at 141-42. In addition, the major difficulty with the Fourth
Circuit's action was that it ordered a de novo trial of the issue to be held before the
district court. See id.
137. See supra note 56 & infra notes 144-46 and authority cited therein.
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (1994).
139. See Jack Q. Lever, Jr., The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circui 64J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 178, 188; Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92489, 86 Stat. 807
(1972), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88 Stat. 1153 (1974).
The Hruska
Commission's final report was entitled COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL
COURT
APPELLATE
SYSTEM,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

STRUCTURE

AND

INTERNAL

PROCEDURE:

(1975), reprintedin 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).

140. See 67 F.R.D. 195, 209-12 (1975).
141. See id. at 219-20.
142. See id. at 220. This forum shopping "demeans the entire judicial process
and patent system as well." See id. The root of the problem was the lack of
guidance by a single court with nationally bindingjudgments. See id.
143. See Robert Desmond, Note, Nothing Seems "Obvious" to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit: The Federal Circuit, Unchecked by the Supreme Court, Transforms
the Standards of Obviousness Under the Patent Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 455, 460-63
(1993).
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144

One underlying premise was that placing all patent cases
patents.
before a single court would increase the expertise of that body and cause
it to create higher quality legal rules. 45 In the end, creation of the
Federal Circuit unified patent law, mostly without the Supreme Court's
intervention.146

The argument that deferential review is required to promote
uniformity between jurisdictions simply does not work with respect to PTO
determinations. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction for all PTO appeals.
Therefore, review of PTO determinations is inherently uniform.
4. Attorney GeneralStatements
Attorney general statements made during the passage and
implementation of the APA indicate enactment of the APA's standards of
review for agencies was not meant to affect PTO appeals. 147 While the
intended scope of the APA was broad,'4 8 the APA was not designed to alter
the review process of PTO decisions. The existing clearly erroneous
standard of review survived the enactment of the APA.
Attorney General Clark supplied opinions concerning the APA and
aided in drafting the "Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act."
Attorney General Clark, while discussing the APA's
150
provision on reviewable acts, stated: "[T] his provision does not apply to
situations where the Congress has provided special and adequate review
procedures ....Thus, the Customs Court and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals retain their present exclusive jurisdiction. " 151 Attorney
General Clark also expressed that the APA did not apply to the procedure
of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals "nor affect the requirement
of resort thereto. " 152 Statements by Attorney General Clark regarding the

APA have been given deference by the Supreme Court. 153

144.
17.
145.

Therefore,

See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15See id.

146.

See Desmond, supra note 143, at 463-64.

147.

See CLARK, supra note 132, at 101.

148.

See supra note 56, 144-46 and authority cited therein.

149. See CLARK, supra note 132, at 101.
150. See5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994).
151. In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see CLARK, supra note
132, at 101.
152. Lueders, 111 F.3d at 1575; seeCLARM, supra note 132, at 101 n.15.
153. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 n.22 (1981) (noting that Justice
Clark was Attorney General both when the APA was passed and when the APA

Manual was published); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) (stating that the

Attorney General's Manual has frequently been given deference because of the
role played by the Department of Justice in drafting the APA); United States v.
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statements by Attorney General Clark stating that the APA did not affect
Patent Appeals is substantial evidence that the APA was not intended to
affect PTO appeals. The existing clearly erroneous standard of review
survived the enactment of the APA.
5. PTO CommissionerStatements
Casper W. Ooms, Commissioner of Patents, believed that the
enactment of the APA did not substantiality change operations within the
PTO or review of its decisions. Commissioner Ooms stated that the APA
study ignored the PTO. T5
Commissioner Ooms noted that only a
footnote of confession was left to report that "the highly specialized
character of the Patent Office and the insufficiency of the Committee's
staff led first to the postponement and then to abandonment of plans to
study this agency."
The Commissioner believed that the PTO had
anticipated and resolved the problems which the APA was created to
solve.
He stated that the PTO provided the applicant with the full
requisites of process that the APA ensured including full review.
Commissioner Ooms stated that the enactment of the APAjudicial review
"will have the effect of minimizing the technical aspects of the review and
... the courts will welcome the appellant as exercising a right to
review ....
[t]hus will the substantive purposes of the [APA] be
served." 158 An agency's contemporaneous construction of a statute or its
own regulations is to be given great weight.159 Therefore, even the
commissioner of the PTO believed that the existing clearly erroneous
standard of review survived the enactment of the APA.
6.

The PTO Does Not Perform The Functions That Call For
DeferentialReview

Review under the deferential standard of substantial evidence is
based on the view that the lower tribunal possesses either of two
advantages over the appellate court: (1) a greater ability to determine
Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 96 (1956) (holding that "a contemporaneous construction of
a statute by the officer charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight");
Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931) (holding that a
"contemporaneous construction by those charged with the administration of the
act, is entitled to respectful consideration, and will not be overruled except for
weighty reasons").
154. See Casper W. Ooms, The United States Patent Office and the Administrative
ProcedureAct, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 149, 149 (1948).
155. Id. (citing S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 4 n.2 (1944)).
156.
157.
158.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 159.

159.

See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978).
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credibility and veracity of witnesses; or (2) greater expertise in the subject
matter under consideration.'6
Review of PTO factual finding for
substantial evidence is inappropriate because the PTO possesses neither of
these advantages.
The PTO does not have a greater ability to determine credibility and
veracity of witnesses. The PTO adjudicates patent applications on the
written record. TM The..162
PTO adjudicates interference proceedings on the
As a consequence, the agency cannot claim to
written record as well.
have a superior ability to judge the credibility of the assertions made
before it. The Federal Circuit has the same ability to adjudicate on a
written record as the PTO does.
The Supreme Court believes that the Federal Circuit is especially
expert in patent law. The Supreme Court has recognized the Federal
Circuit's review of patent appeals as "sound judgment in this area of its
special expertise."
This sound judrIment is testimony to the Federal
Circuit's large expertise in patent law.
Indeed, Congress believed that
placing all patent cases before a single court would increase the expertise
of that body and cause it to create higher quality legal rules.
The patent statute has given the PTO a role that is very limited in
nature when compared to the patent system as a whole. 165 A patent issued
by the PTO only gives the patent owner a fully revocable license to sue for
infringement.
The PTO's claims
of expertise are suspect even with
167
regard to the PTO's core functions.
The PTO certainly has a significantly lesser claim to expertise than

160.
STEIN,

See Stern, supra note 25, at 70; DAVIS &

PIERCE,

supra note 27, § 11.2;

supranote 88, § 51.01 [1].

161. See 35 U.S.C. § 143 (1994).
162. See id. § 146.
163. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1054
(1997).
164. See generally Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and
Substantive Policy: The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 L. & Soc'Y REv. 823
(1977) (discussing the effect of the patent-specialist judges on the formation of
substantive patent law as explored in the context of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals). Congress itself recognized, in creating the Federal Circuit, that
the Federal Circuit's lawmaking expertise in the patent area could be
strengthened through the appointment of patent specialists to the court. See S.
REP. No. 97-275, at 5-6 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15-16 (noting, in
reference to 28 U.S.C. § 46(a), that judges of the Federal Circuit will have the
"benefit of expertise in highly specialized and technical areas").
165. See Moy, supra note 85, at 429-30.
166. See id. at 430; see also In re Crawford, 154 F.2d 670 (C.C.P.A. 1946) (Bland,
J., dissenting) (stating that "[p]atents are only prima facie evidence of invention
and, as has been true for more than one hundred years, the equity courts,
generally speaking, may be trusted, upon more complete records, to correct any
mistakes made by the Patent Office in granting patents").
167. See Moy, supra note 85, at 431.
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do other federal agencies. The PTO is not a unified agency in the sense
the
of administrative law.'6 Unified agencies are those that perform
..
..
.
169
functions of substantive rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication.
The Environmental Protection Agency is an example of a typical unified
170
agency.
The PTO, in contrast, does not perform any of these three typical
administrative functions. It has no substantive rulemaking authority in
the area of patent law.' 7 1
It does not enforce patents against
infringement.
Neither does it adjudicate the question of patent
infringement itself.173 In reality, the PTO's decision whether to allow
patent applications to issue merely controls the grant of an initial license
to sue for patent infringement.
Even the grant is subject to being
revoked by a later action in the district courts.
The conclusion is therefore that the PTO is much less entitled to
claim expertise in patent law than the EPA in environmental law, or the
76
Securities and Exchange Commission in the law of securities regulation.1
To say that the PTO is the most expert agency in patent law is no answer.
The patent system is simply an area of law that does not rely on the federal
administrative structure for anything more than light assistance.
This general lack of expertise in the PTO is coupled with an
unusually large expertise in the Federal Circuit. Congress consolidated all
appeals in patent matters into the.. jurisdiction
of the Federal Circuit to
.. .
'77
create an expert body within the judiciary.
Clearly, Congress assumed
that creation of an expert judicial body would improve administration of
the patent system.
This assumption must necessarily have included the further
expectation that the Federal Circuit would be able to use its expertise.
Looked at in this way, the PTO's call for greater deference is inconsistent
with the Congressional plan for administering the patent system. The
specter of this inconsistency is especially alarming at the present time,
168. See id. at 426-27.
169. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 111 S. Ct.
1171, 1176 (1991).

170.

See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15, 623 (1970).

171. See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (stating authority only to promulgate rules for
the conduct of PTO proceedings).
172. See id. § 281 (providing remedy by private action of patentee).
173. See id. (providing for civil action).
174. See Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) (stating that civil action may determine
invalidity "on any ground specified... as a condition for patentability").
176. See Green v. Rich Iron Co., 944 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (criticizing
district court characterization of the PTO as especially expert in questions of
public use and sale).
177. See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 5-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 1517.
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when recent Supreme Court authority may soon have the effect of sharply
enlarging the proportion of issues
in patent law that are denominated
17
8
issues of fact, as opposed to law.
7. Appellate Courts Determine Policy
Invention is largely a question of policy, and if it is to be decided by
the court at all, as it must be under the general standard of the Patent Act,
the opinion of the trial judge should not be final. 179 Policy considerations
are very important in the patent field. It has been asserted that patents
stimulate invention180and investment and are therefore the basis for
economic progress.
It has also been noted that the grant of a patent
gives inventors monopoly-like rights which determinately affect
economics.181
This detrimental effect on economics is the dark side of patent
protection. The costs as well as the benefits of patent protection are
relevant in deciding which inventions should be patented.1s
The
Supreme Court has stated that it is "the underlying policy of the patent
system that 'the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment
of an exclusive patent,' as Jefferson put it, must outweigh the restrictive
effect of the limited patent monopoly."
Clearly an agency as inexpert as
the PTO in patent law must defer to the Federal Circuit to determine
patent law policy as to which inventions are worth the costs of a limited
monopoly of a patent. Review for clear error is consistent with the Federal
Circuit's responsibility.
8. Review for ClearErrorProvidesDoctrinalStability
Review of PTO factual determinations for substantial evidence is
wrong because it runs counter to the basic principles of stare decisis and
adherence to precedent. Proper
for
is one of the most
. . respect
.
.
. precedent
184
fundamental tenets of American jurisprudence.
Without it, the law is
unable to ensure that like persons will be treated alike. Doctrinal stability

178. See Markmam v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)
(announcing functional analysis to govern classification of issues into law or fact).
179. See Comment, Appellate Review of Determinations of PatentableInventions, 29
U. CHI. L. REv. 185, 195-97 (1961).
180. See John C. Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 649, 653 (1947).
181. See Moy, supra note 85, at 426.
182. See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1345-46 (7th Cir.
1984) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. (citing Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966)).
184. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Pub. Trans., 483 U.S. 468, 479
(1987).
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also plays a critical role in fostering predictability."'
Stare decisis stands in the way of changing the standard of review. The
precedent of law is clear: PTO factual determinations are reviewed under
the "clearly erroneous" standard. 18 6 This current standard of review is
antiquated. Judicial review of PTO determinations began in 1839.187 "A
long-standing practice should not be set aside absent substantial reason to
Legal rules,189 even standards of review, are not to be disturbed
do so.
Good reason does not exist simply because the
without good reason.
Therefore, without a
PTO is currently fascinated with the issue.
substantial reason to do so, the current standard of review of PTO factual
findings should not be set aside.
A uniform standard of review for PTO and district court factual
findings works best.
"From a practical, judicial policy standpoint,
moreover, patentability [validity] issues such as anticipation, whether
decided by the Board or by district courts, should be reviewed similarly." 19°

185. SeePayne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
186. See In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the
question of what the prior art teaches is a question of fact subject to review for
clear error); In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that the
court reviews for clear error underlying PTO factual findings leading to an
obviousness conclusion); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding
that the Board clearly erred in determining that the prior art supplied the
requisite teachings); In reVaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that
obviousness is a legal question which the court independently reviews, though
based upon underlying factual findings which the court reviews under the clearly
erroneous standard); In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(stating that the court's review of PTO factual findings is under the clearly
erroneous standard); In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding
that anticipation is a fact question subject to review under the clearly erroneous
standard, further stating that review of a finding of anticipation is the same
whether it was made by the board or by a district court); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887,
892 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that in considering the correctness of the Board's
decision, the court reviews any underlying facts found by the Board under the
clearly erroneous standard); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(stating that review under the clearly erroneous standard is applicable to PTO
factual determinations); In re Kunzmann, 326 F.2d 424, 426 (C.C.P.A 1964)
(holding that appellant had failed to demonstrate that the examiner's factual
finding was clearly erroneous); see also DUNNER, supra note 45, § 6.04 (stating that
it is frequently noted that factual determinations of the PTO boards are subject to
the "clearly erroneous" standard).
187. See Patent Act of 1839, § 11, ch. 88, 5 Stat. 353-55.
188. In re Lueders, 111 F.3d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) (stating that
absent a change in statute or facts to merit overruling precedent, it is within stare
decisis to continue to apply precedent).
189. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 n.23
(1989) (discussing potential effects of change in standard of review).
190. Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "if we did not
require the Board to adhere to the same level of specificity in explicit fact findings
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If the Federal Circuit was forced to adopt a heightened deference to PTO
factual finding over district court factual finding, the Federal Circuit
might be compelled to hold the same patent both valid and invalid over
the same prior art.
This paradox would result only because of the
differing standards of review.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proper standard of review of PTO factual findings is the
fundamental first step in review of many PTO determinations. The entire
patent bar should be concerned about the expanding role the PTO is
trying to assert in adjudicating patent matters before that agency. This
expanding role comes at the expense of the oversight role performed by
the Federal Circuit.
Much to the disbelief of the PTO, it does not make patent law. The
PTO is not as expert in patent law as is Federal Circuit. Nor does it
perform functions that call for deferential review.
The judicial provisions of the APA do not require review under a
more deferential standard of substantial evidence only. In fact, review of
the PTO's factual determinations for clear error is more consistent with
the APA's purpose and overall structure. Review for clear error is also
consistent with the Federal Circuit's role of determining patent policy and
its oversight role of the PTO.
Review of the factual determinations of the PTO for clear error,
under the current law, is well established and appropriate. The law places
a high premium on stability. As a result, fundamental principles of
jurisprudence argue strongly in favor of retaining the current practice.
Brian C. Whipps

and legal conclusions to support an anticipation finding, appellate review of the
very same claim might produce disparate results, depending simply on which
tribunal decided the issue." Id.
191. See In re Lueders, 111 F.3d at 1577 (stating that the clear error standard of
review should apply to PTO factual determinations in order to maintain
consistency with the standard of review for district court factual determinations).
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